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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
         This appeal comes to us from a final order of deportation issued 
by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals.  Petitioner Aladetohun Olaniyi Bamidele, a thirty-
eight year old native and 
citizen of Nigeria, asks us to review the decision of the Board ordering 
him deported because he 
obtained an adjustment of status pursuant to § 245(a) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act 
("the Act"), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), through a sham marriage.  Bamidele claims 
that the Board erred 
as a matter of law in ordering him deported because the grounds for 
deportation relate only to his 
fraudulent adjustment of status.  He contends that Immigration and 
Naturalization Service 
("INS") action to rescind that adjustment is barred by the five year 
statute of limitation contained 
in § 246(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a).  Because there is no reason to 
adjust Bamidele's 
permanent resident status other than the sham marriage which enabled him 
to obtain permanent 
resident status under § 246(a) and because adjustment under § 246(a) is 
now barred, we conclude 
that Bamidele's permanent resident status cannot presently be rescinded.  
As a result, we find 
that he is not now deportable on the sole grounds of his misconduct in 
obtaining his adjustment 
of status. 
                           I. Facts   
         Bamidele has lived and worked in this country for over fourteen 
years since entering 
the United States as a non-immigrant visitor on February 19, 1982.  
Shortly after arriving in 
America, Bamidele took up residence in Philadelphia with his brother 
Larry, who had previously 
emigrated to this country.  Bamidele then began his college education, 
eventually earning a Bachelor 
of Science degree in Management, and supported himself by driving a cab on 
nights and weekends.  
Following his graduation in 1986, Bamidele held a variety of jobs until 
establishing himself with his 
current employer in 1990.  In this position of construction inspector and 
field technician, Bamidele 
has earned the praise and respect of his employer who has described him as 
a "very intelligent, 
dedicated and self-motivated person" and a "very valuable employee." 
         Bamidele's current troubles with the INS, arise out of his May 
19, 1983, marriage to 
Kim Bonita Griffin, a U.S. citizen.  A year later, on April 10, 1984, on 
the basis of this marriage, 
Bamidele applied for and was granted an adjustment of status to that of 
lawful permanent resident 
pursuant to § 245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).   In 1985, however, 
while participating in a joint 
FBI/INS investigation of student loan fraud, the FBI inquired into the 
validity of Bamidele's 
marriage to Ms. Griffin.  Ms. Griffin told an FBI agent in an interview 
that her marriage to 
Bamidele had been a sham and the two had never lived together.  Despite 
having this information 
in 1985, the INS took no action for five years.  Bamidele and Griffin were 
subsequently divorced 
on June 17, 1988. 
         On January 31, 1990, the INS finally acted, serving Bamidele with 
an Order to Show 
Cause why he should not be deported.  This Order alleged that Bamidele had 
obtained his 
"permanent resident status through fraud," thus rendering his "permanent 
resident status nul [sic] 
and void." Cert. Admin. Rec. at 39.  The Order further charged Bamidele 
with violating § 241(a)(2) 
of the Act in two counts.  The first count charged Bamidele with being in 
the United States in 
violation of law under § 241(a)(2) of the Act, while the second count 
charged Bamidele, also under 
§ 241(a)(2), with committing fraud within the meaning of § 241(c)(2).  A 
hearing followed at which 
Bamidele through counsel presented testimony and other evidence that he 
and Griffin had been in 
love and intended to make a life together.  Bamidele also argued that he 
was not deportable under 
a proper reading of §§ 241(a)(2) and 241(c)(2).  The immigration  judge, 
stating that he found 
Bamidele's version of events incredible, ordered him deported on both 
counts as of October 10, 
1991.  
         Bamidele then embarked on a lengthy appeals process.  Appearing 
pro se, he first 
filed a notice of appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals in which he 
reiterated his contentions 
that his marriage to Griffin was genuine and argued that the immigration 
judge had erred as a matter 
of law in his reading of §§ 241(a)(2) and 241(c)(2).  When Bamidele failed 
to file a brief with the 
Board, it affirmed the immigration judge on all bases in a per curiam 
opinion dated December 4, 
1992.  The only arguments on which the Board reached the merits were 
Bamidele's contention that 
the second charge was invalid because he did not "reenter" the United 
States within two years of 
marriage and his assertion that the Board should not have credited 
Griffin's testimony.  The Board 
summarily rejected both positions in its two page dismissal of Bamidele's 
appeal.  On March 15, 
1993, the Board in a second opinion rejected Bamidele's "Motion to 
Reconsider" which the Board 
styled as a "Motion to Reopen" the deportation hearings. 
         Again represented by counsel, Bamidele filed two petitions for 
review in this Court 
which were consolidated for purposes of appeal.  In an unreported opinion, 
we ruled that Bamidele 
was not deportable under § 241(c)(2) because any fraud by Bamidele, who at 
all times relevant to 
this litigation resided in the United States, was committed solely for the 
purpose of obtaining an 
adjustment of status and not for the purpose of  gaining "entry" to this 
country. Bamidele v. 
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Nos. 93-3098 & 93-3282, 31 F.3d. 
1170 (3rd Cir. 1994)  
(Table). We also remanded for the Board to determine whether Bamidele 
could be deported solely 
on the basis of § 241(a)(2) as stated in the first count of the Order.   
Additionally, although Bamidele 
raised before us the question of the effect of the statute of limitations 
applicable to rescission actions 
under § 246(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a), we refused to consider it 
because we determined that 
it and several additional issues had not be fully briefed and considered 
by the Board. 
         Upon remand, the Board again affirmed the immigration judge's 
order of deportation 
pursuant to § 241(a)(2) of the Act. Bamidele v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Serv., No. A26 387 
101 - Philadelphia (B.I.A. Nov. 13, 1995).  The Board first took up the 
question of whether the 
running of the five year statute of limitations for rescission of 
adjustment of status in § 246(a) of the 
Act also precluded the initiation of deportation proceedings.  Relying on 
agency adjudications as 
precedent, the Board held that the five year limitation in no way impeded 
deportation proceedings 
after the lapse of the period for rescission.  The Board then addressed 
the question of Bamidele's 
deportability under § 241(a)(2) as an alien who is "not presently in 
possession of a valid immigrant 
or valid non-immigrant visa or other valid document" by virtue of having 
obtained his 
documentation through a sham marriage.  On this charge the Board found 
that Bamidele never 
qualified for adjustment of status because he was not an "alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent 
residence." § 245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1255(a). 
                       II.  Jurisdiction 
         Bamidele has filed a timely appeal for review of a final order of 
deportation 
issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals.  The Board held appellate 
jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b)(2).  Our jurisdiction to review the 
Board's order is exclusive 
and arises under § 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a).  
                     III.  Standard of Review As a preliminary matter we 
must determine the appropriate standard of review to 
apply in examining the Board's interpretation of its governing statute.  
The INS asserts that this case 
is controlled by Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 
U.S. 837 (1984), and 
its progeny which require us to accord "considerable weight . . . to an 
executive department's 
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . ." 
Id. at 844 (footnote omitted).  
Bamidele does not quarrel with the general applicability of Chevron's 
analysis and concedes as 
much in his brief. (See Appellant's Reply Br. at 7-8). 
         We, of course, also acknowledge the general applicability of 
Chevron's analysis  to 
our review of an agency's interpretations of its governing statutes.  As 
the Supreme Court has stated, 
Chevron divides our analysis into two steps: 
         First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly 
spoken 
         to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is 
clear, that 
         is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, 
must give 
         effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  If, 
         however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed 
         the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose 
its 
         own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the 
absence 
         of an administrative interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is 
silent or 
         ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the 
         court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
         construction of the statute. 
 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).  When, as in this case, 
Congress has given us little 
guidance, thereby implicitly delegating the matter, we must yield to an 
agency interpretation which 
is a reasonable construction of the statutory provision. Id. at 844.   
Furthermore, we are especially 
aware that the INS's interpretations of the statutes it is charged with 
administering have typically 
been afforded a great deal of deference. See, e.g., Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) ("the courts must respect the 
interpretation of the 
agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for 
administering the statutory program"); 
Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d. 1540, 1546-47 (3rd Cir. 1995) ("The BIA's 
interpretation of the burden 
of proof provisions of the INA is entitled to deference under the 
standards set forth in Chevron."); 
Fatin v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3rd 1233, 1239 (3d. 
Cir. 1993) ("the Board of 
Immigration Appeals' interpretation of a provision of the Refugee Act is 
entitled to deference 
pursuant to the standards set out in Chevron . . . "). 
         We do not, however, believe this to be the typical case requiring 
agency deference.  
Bamidele challenges the Attorney General's construction of the statute of 
limitations contained in 
§ 246(a) of the Act, which limits actions by the INS to rescind an alien's 
adjustment of status.  A 
statute of limitations is not a matter within the particular expertise of 
the INS.  Rather, we consider 
this "a clearly legal issue that courts are better equipped to handle." 
Dion v. Secretary of Health and 
Human Serv., 823 F.2d 669, 673 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Lynch v. Lying, 
872 F.2d 718, 724 (6th 
Cir. 1989) ("the amount of weight accorded an agency interpretation 
diminishes further when the 
interpretation does not require special knowledge within the agency's 
field of technical expertise"); 
In re Oliver M. Elam, Jr., Co., Inc., 771 F.2d 174, 181(6th Cir. 1985) 
("When interpretation of the 
statute does not require special knowledge within the agency's field of 
technical expertise, reviewing 
courts sometimes accord little deference to the agency's construction."). 
         Although the INS cites several cases from this Circuit for the 
proposition that 
deference to its views is required, a closer reading reveals that each is 
inapposite to the question now 
before the Court.   In Yang, 68 F.3rd at 1546-50, we addressed complicated 
matters such as the 
allocation of the burden of proof and the elements of the entry test for 
determining whether an alien 
is subject to exclusion proceedings or is entitled to the additional 
process available in deportation 
proceedings.  Similarly, in Fatin, 12 F.3d. at 1238-1243, we took up the 
equally daunting question 
of the meaning of the term "particular social group" for the purpose of 
determining whether the alien 
was entitled to withholding of deportation or asylum.  Finally, in Katsis 
v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Serv., 997 F.2d 1067, 1070-1075 (3rd Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 1081 (1994), 
we considered the definition of the phrase "lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence" as used in 
the context of § 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).  Each of these 
cases concerned matters 
labyrinthine in their complexity in which our analysis would be bolstered 
by our reliance on the 
expertise of the INS.  Moreover, the latter two cases addressed 
terminology which took on unique 
import and meaning informed by the INS's interpretation of its governing 
statute.  
         The instant question, in contrast, evokes none of these 
considerations.  While we 
recognize § 246(a) as a part of the Act that the INS is charged with 
administering, a statute of 
limitations is a general legal concept with which the judiciary can deal 
at least as competently as can 
an executive agency.  Cf.,  Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1352 n.9 (9th 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
sub nom., American Fed'n of Labor and Congress of Indus. Orgs., 490 U.S. 
1035 (1989) ("While 
we ordinarily give great weight to the interpretation of the agency 
charged with enforcement of the 
statute we are construing, . . . that deference does not extend to the 
question of judicial review, a 
matter within the peculiar expertise of the courts.").  Thus, in reviewing 
the INS's interpretation of 
the statute of limitations applicable to rescission actions we "will not 
grant it any presumption of 
special expertise . . . ." United States Dep't of Navy v. Federal Labor 
Relations Auth., 840 F.2d 
1131, 1134 (3rd Cir. 1988). 
                        IV.  Discussion 
         We need only address one of the points Bamidele raises on this 
appeal.  He contends 
first that the five year statute of limitations in § 246(a) of the Act has 
run and prevents the INS from 
initiating rescission proceedings.  He further maintains that, in these 
circumstances, proceedings to 
rescind the adjustment of status granted him by the INS are a prerequisite 
to initiating deportation 
proceedings.  Thus, Bamidele concludes the INS erred as a matter of law in 
ordering him deported 
under § 241(a)(2) when it was time barred from first rescinding his 
adjustment of status.  
Notwithstanding its concession that the limitations period for a 
rescission action has run, the INS 
insists that it properly ordered Bamidele deported under § 241(a)(2). We 
reject the INS's invitation 
to effectively read § 246(a) out of existence.  Instead we hold, given the 
novel facts of this case, that 
rescission proceedings, and by extension the proceedings to deport 
Bamidele, are time barred. 
         The Immigration and Nationality Act enacted by Congress in 1952 
created a statutory 
scheme nearly devoid of limitation periods on enforcement actions by the 
INS. See Lehmann v. 
United States ex rel Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957) (discussing elimination 
of five year limitation 
period previously contained in the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, 
Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 
874, 889 (1917)); see also Charles Gordon, et al., Immigration Law and 
Procedure § 71.01[2][c] 
(1996).  One exception, however, appeared in § 246(a), which provided in 
pertinent part: 
         If, at any time within five years after the status of a person 
has been 
         otherwise adjusted under the provisions of section 1255 or 1259 
of 
         this title or any other provision of law to that of an alien 
lawfully 
         admitted for permanent residence, it shall appear to the 
satisfaction 
         of the Attorney General that the person was not in fact eligible 
for 
         such adjustment of status, the Attorney General shall rescind the 
         action taken granting an adjustment of status to such person and 
         cancelling deportation in the case of such person if that 
occurred and 
         the person shall thereupon be subject to all provisions of this 
chapter 
         to the same extent as if the adjustment of status had not been 
made. 
 
§ 246(a), 8 U.S.C. 1256(a) (1970), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (Supp. 
1996).  The question of 
what force this provision possesses lies at the heart of this case. 
         The INS construes the statute of limitations based on "its belief 
that ‘the five-year 
limitation in § 246(a) is a historical anomaly or the result of an 
accident in the legislative process.'" 
Oloteo v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 643 F.2d 679, 683 n.8 (9th 
Cir. 1981).  Thus, the 
INS argues that, although § 246(a) proscribes an untimely rescission of an 
alien's status adjustment, 
it has no effect on the INS's ability to deport that same immigrant on the 
very same grounds the INS 
claims render the original adjustment of status improper. 
     While we are aware of the substantial body of case law which has 
accumulated at the agency 
level and in the Ninth Circuit addressing the scope and effect of the § 
246(a) limitation period, we 
nevertheless conclude that the running of the limitation period bars the 
rescission of Bamidele's 
permanent resident status and, in the absence of the commission of any 
other offense, thereby bars 
initiation of deportation proceedings in this case.   
     The INS relies heavily on the reasoning expressed in the Attorney 
General's opinions issued 
in In re Belenzo, 17 I. & N. Dec. 374, (A.G. 1981), and In re S--, 9 I & N 
Dec. 548 (A.G. 1962).   
In In re S--, the Attorney General took the following narrow view of §§ 
245 and 246(a): 
      [R]escission places an alien in the same position "as if the 
adjustment of status had 
     not been made"; that is, one whose status was adjusted under section 
245 to that of 
     an alien "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" is, through 
rescission, returned 
     to nonimmigrant status.  Consequently the effect of the five-year 
limitation on 
     rescission is simply to bar the Attorney General from returning an 
alien with adjusted 
     status to the category of nonimmigrant. . . . 
          I recognize that as I construe the time limitation in section 
246 it may be of 
     little practical value to the alien.  While the limitation obviously 
prevents the 
     Attorney General from returning the alien to the category of a 
nonimmigrant it could 
     be argued that this entails no real benefit to the alien since the 
same conduct 
     nevertheless can be utilized independently as a ground for his 
deportation or 
     exclusion.  This makes it difficult to ascertain precisely why 
Congress enacted the 
     time limitation.  But whatever purpose Congress may have intended the 
time 
     limitation to serve, it is clear that it could not, consistently with 
the policies 
     underlying the provisions of the adjusted status laws here involved, 
have intended to 
     confer upon an alien of adjusted status the benefit of immunity from 
exclusion or 
     deportation for prior conduct. 
 
In re S--, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 553-555. 
     Even were we to accept the reasoning expressed in the Attorney 
General's interpretation of 
the statute, however, we would be compelled to a different result by 
existing Third Circuit precedent.  
In Quintana v. Holland, 255 F.2d 161, 164 (3rd Cir. 1958), we opined: 
     That which is accomplished by a rescission of status is pretty harsh.  
It is comparable 
     to the revocation of citizenship about which the courts have been 
very keen to make 
     sure that the individual received careful protection.  The rescission 
blocks the man 
     on the road to citizenship, and results in banishment from a country 
where he may 
     have lived a long time, as in this case.  We think, therefore, that 
Congress meant to 
     require the Attorney General to take the described action within five 
years and to be 
     bound by that limitation itself. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  Perhaps we are placing a greater premium on the 
durability of an alien's 
adjustment of status than our counterparts in the executive branch, but to 
do less would "undermine 
the security which ought to attend permanent resident status." Fulgencio 
v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Serv., 573 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Choe v. 
Immigration and 
Naturalization Serv., 11 F.3d at 930  ("Aliens who obtain adjusted status 
have a legitimate 
expectation that their immigration will be permanent.").  The severity of 
the delayed onset of 
deportation proceedings is amply demonstrated here.  If the INS were able 
to push the matter 
through, Bamidele would have to relinquish his home, contacts with his 
brother and his friends in 
the United States, and leave his job to return to Nigeria, a country with 
which he has had little 
contact for nearly fifteen years. 
     In any event, we believe the authorities relied on by the INS are 
inapposite to the instant case.  
With the exception of In re Belenzo, 17 I. & N. Dec. 374 (1981), not one 
of these decisions precisely 
addresses the question we confront here.  That is, none are responsive to 
the distinction that the sole 
grounds on which the INS has founded its deportation order are the same as 
those which the INS 
claims rendered Bamidele's adjustment of status invalid.  It defies logic 
to say that facts known to 
the INS within five years of Bamidele's adjustment of status and which 
would form the basis of a 
rescission action (had the INS taken timely action) should also empower 
the INS to deport Bamidele.  
We find the opinion expressed by the Board in In re Belenzo more 
persuasive and consistent with 
the aim of the statute than was the reasoning of the Attorney General.  
The Board stated, "The bar 
[to deportation] exists only where deportation is based on an attack on 
the adjustment itself, as here. 
If the adjustment is thus attacked, it must be attacked directly, and 
within the 5 years.  If deportation 
is predicated on something outside the adjustment, there is no bar." Id. 
at 380.   
     Were we  not  to enforce  the statute of limitations in this narrowly 
defined situation, we, in 
practical effect, would be construing it out of existence.  Our acceptance 
of  the Attorney General's 
position, would force us to conclude that the only purpose served by the § 
246(a) limitation period 
is to "merely to ‘cut off the availability of a procedure which, although 
to all intents and purposes 
would establish deportability, permitted the Attorney General to act more 
informally and 
expeditiously than he could in a deportation proceeding'." Id. at 382-83 
(quoting In re S--, 9 I. & N. 
Dec. At 555 n.8.)  The Attorney General concludes that this reading of the 
statute flows naturally 
from the observation that procedural safeguards in deportation actions are 
established by statute, 
while in rescission actions Congress implicitly left it to the agency to 
develop such protections.  SeeIn re S--, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 555 n.8.  We 
note, however, that essentially the same procedural 
measures, including notice and a hearing, are available in both rescission 
and deportation actions. 
Compare 8 C.F.R. §§ 246.1 to 246.9, with 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b).  To us, the 
agency's choice to provide 
this additional process evidences its awareness that the consequences of 
rescission are comparable 
in severity to those associated with deportation.  Hence, we cannot agree 
that Congress, presumably 
knowing that rescission usually places an alien at immediate risk of 
deportation, would go to the 
trouble of enacting a statute of limitations on rescission actions, and 
then intend it to be construed 
so narrowly that it offered virtually no protection from untimely action 
by the INS. 
                         V.  Conclusion 
     We hold that the running of the limitation period contained in § 
246(a) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1256(a), prohibits the INS from 
initiating deportation proceedings 
based exclusively on fraud in obtaining the adjustment of status. We 
express no opinion as to 
whether the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment Act of 1986 (IMFA), Pub. 
L. 99-639, 100 
Stat. 3537 (1986), the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 
4978 (1990), or any other 
subsequent amendments to the Act would make someone in Bamidele's position 
deportable.  
Furthermore, in light of our disposition of the case, we need not reach 
the issue of whether Bamidele 
is deportable exclusively under § 241(a)(2). 
     Thus, we will grant the petition for review, we will vacate the order 
of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals dated November 13, 1995, and we will remand this case  
to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals with instructions to terminate the deportation 
proceedings.  Each party to bear 
its own costs. 
